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2026 Q2 Shareholder Voting Report

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2062278	HK0008011667	PCCW Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	3a 3d 3c 4 5,7	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to non-audit fees being greater than 50% of audit-related fees, which may adversely influence the independence of the audit, based on a potential conflict of interest in protecting material non-audit fees.[Auditor2] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2069124	HK0000069689	AIA Group Limited	Asia	Hong Kong	22/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2057222	SG1S04926220	Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited	Asia	Singapore	16/04/2026	Annual	Against	2(a)	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1]		1
2062960	SG0531000230	Venture Corporation Limited	Asia	Singapore	24/04/2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2064776	SG2D54973185	Sheng Siong Group Ltd.	Asia	Singapore	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	5 8	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2065291	SG1V12936232	StarHub Ltd.	Asia	Singapore	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	4 7	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2088096	TW0003711008	ASE Technology Holding Co., Ltd.	Asia	Taiwan	24/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2042564	AU000000ILU1	Iluka Resources Limited	Australia & New Zealand	Australia	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	3a 2,3b	Administrative declaration Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2021030	AU000000QBE9	QBE Insurance Group Limited	Australia & New Zealand	Australia	08/05/2026	Annual	Against	5c	Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		1
2062948	AU0000090128	TPG Telecom Limited	Australia & New Zealand	Australia	08/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2042813	AU0000184459	Ventia Services Group Limited	Australia & New Zealand	Australia	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2066152	KYG875721634	Tencent Holdings Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	13/05/2026	Annual	All For			3b,5	1
2062234	HK0000093390	HKT Trust and HKT Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	3b 5,7 4 3c	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2086277	KYG4602S1057	Horizon Robotics	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	4,5,6 2,3 9 11,12	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2093829	KYG3902L1095	GDS Holdings Limited	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	25/06/2026	Annual	Against	1 4 6	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2093635	KYG596691041	Meituan	Emerging Markets	Cayman Islands	26/06/2026	Annual	Against	7	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2087533	CNE0000018R8	Kweichow Moutai Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	5 8.2	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2094344	CNE100006Z79	Zhejiang Sanhua Intelligent Controls Co., Ltd.	Emerging Markets	China	29/06/2026	Annual	Against	17 12	Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2085178	IL0010845571	Nova Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Israel	18/06/2026	Annual	All For				2
2080876	IL0011407140	UroGen Pharma Ltd.	Emerging Markets	Israel	22/06/2026	Annual	Against	2 1g 5	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1

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2084699	KZ1C00001536	Kaspi.kz JSC	Emerging Markets	Kazakhstan	11/06/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	Not Voted	4.1,4.2			1
2084737	MX01GE0E0004	Gentera SAB de CV	Emerging Markets	Mexico	29/05/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				1
2084740	MX01GE0E0004	Gentera SAB de CV	Emerging Markets	Mexico	29/05/2026	Ordinary Shareholders	All For				1
2041339	AT0000BAWAG2	BAWAG Group AG	Europe	Austria	22/04/2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2039590	BE0974349814	Warehouses De Pauw SA	Europe	Belgium	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	12 1.2C1	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2061704	BE0003739530	UCB SA	Europe	Belgium	30/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	8.2 5	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2037709	BE0974464977	Syensqo NV	Europe	Belgium	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2044274	BE6360403164	Titan America SA	Europe	Belgium	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	7b,7c	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2037704	BE0003565737	KBC Group NV	Europe	Belgium	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	10.1,10.3 7	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2070952	BE0974264930	ageas SA/NV	Europe	Belgium	20/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039405	BE0003764785	Ackermans & van Haaren NV	Europe	Belgium	26/05/2026	Annual	Against	6.3,7	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2010767	FI4000552500	Sampo Oyj	Europe	Finland	22/04/2026	Annual	All For				1
2051800	FR0000052292	Hermes International SCA	Europe	France	17/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	5 7,8,9,11,18 6	Concern that there is insufficient evidence to justify that the related party transaction is sufficiently in the interests of the company.[DirectorElection4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2]		1
2038621	FR0000121014	LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE	Europe	France	23/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	8 4 11,12 7 9 13,14,16,19,20	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concern that there is insufficient evidence to justify that the related party transaction is sufficiently in the interests of the company.[DirectorElection4] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2051799	FR0000121667	EssilorLuxottica SA	Europe	France	28/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	11 18 5,6,7,9,10	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2037546	FR0000120578	Sanofi	Europe	France	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	10,16	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2044875	FR0000120073	Air Liquide SA	Europe	France	05/05/2026	Annual/Special	All For				2
2059530	FR0000121972	Schneider Electric SE	Europe	France	07/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	12	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2047117	FR0000131104	BNP Paribas SA	Europe	France	12/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	10,11,14,15,16	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2046380	FR0000133308	Orange SA	Europe	France	19/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	8,10,15 6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2049955	FR0000125338	Capgemini SE	Europe	France	20/05/2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2056145	FR0000045072	Credit Agricole SA	Europe	France	20/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	13,14,19,21,22,23,29,33	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing deforestation risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[BiodiversityGL1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2]		1
2067848	FR0014003TT8	Dassault Systemes SE	Europe	France	20/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	5,8,23,24	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2059546	FR0000073272	Safran SA	Europe	France	21/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2072568	FR0000120404	Accor SA	Europe	France	27/05/2026	Annual	Against	10 7,8	Concern that there is insufficient evidence to justify that the related party transaction is sufficiently in the interests of the company.[DirectorElection4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2055739	FR0010307819	Legrand SA	Europe	France	27/05/2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2040129	FR0000121485	Kering SA	Europe	France	28/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	12,13,19	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	5	1

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2047175	FR0000120271	TotalEnergies SE	Europe	France	29/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	6,12,13	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2064057	FR0004125920	Amundi SA	Europe	France	02/06/2026	Annual	Against	22	Concerns that there is insufficient evidence of alignment to 1.5 degrees by the board, which is relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL2]		1
2062197	FR0000125007	Compagnie de Saint-Gobain SA	Europe	France	04/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2065419	FR0011726835	Gaztransport & Technigaz SA	Europe	France	16/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	9,12,13,18	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2084437	FR0000062671	Exail Technologies SA	Europe	France	19/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	9,10 15 19 20 16,17,18	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1] Concerns that the proposal introduces anti-takeover measures which may prevent an offer to acquire shares being presented to long-term shareholders.[ShareholderRights2] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2039652	DE000BAY0017	Bayer AG	Europe	Germany	24/04/2026	Annual	Against	8	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		2
2038343	DE0007164600	SAP SE	Europe	Germany	05/05/2026	Annual	All For			6	3
2039697	DE000DTR0CK8	Daimler Truck Holding AG	Europe	Germany	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	9 4.1	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the overreliance on total shareholder returns (TSR).[RemunerationUK5] 2- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK8] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]	6.4,6.10	1
2033754	DE000SYM9999	Symrise AG	Europe	Germany	06/05/2026	Annual	Against	3 6,7	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2033898	DE000A1EWWW0	adidas AG	Europe	Germany	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	6.1,6.2,7	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039635	DE0008404005	Allianz SE	Europe	Germany	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	6,7	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	8a	1
2039660	DE000A0D9PT0	MTU Aero Engines AG	Europe	Germany	07/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2033899	DE000A0WMPJ6	AIXTRON SE	Europe	Germany	13/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2027333	DE0005190003	Bayerische Motoren Werke AG	Europe	Germany	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	4.4,4.11 4.2	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3]		1
2039024	DE0005810055	Deutsche Boerse AG	Europe	Germany	13/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2039812	DE0006305006	DEUTZ AG	Europe	Germany	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	8	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039790	DE000A0Z2ZZ5	freenet AG	Europe	Germany	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	7.4,7.5 6,8	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039662	DE0005785604	Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA	Europe	Germany	22/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2039789	DE000FTG1111	flatexDEGIRO SE	Europe	Germany	02/06/2026	Annual	Against	10 6	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2033709	DE0006202005	Salzgitter AG	Europe	Germany	03/06/2026	Annual	Against	4 6	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2040257	DE000PFSE212	PFISTERER Holding SE	Europe	Germany	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	4 5 8 7	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our voting policy should be at a higher level in order to better protect minority shareholder interests (see regional voting guidelines on specific thresholds).[BoardStructureGL2] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns related to non-audit fees being greater than 50% of audit-related fees, which may adversely influence the independence of the audit, based on a potential conflict of interest in protecting material non-audit fees.[Auditor2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2048108	IE00BF0L3536	AIB Group plc	Europe	Ireland	30/04/2026	Annual	All For				1
2042194	IE0004906560	Kerry Group Plc	Europe	Ireland	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	3h	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2073525	IE00BK9ZQ967	Trane Technologies Plc	Europe	Ireland	04/06/2026	Annual	Against	1g,3	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		2
2052096	IT0005541336	Lottomatica Group SpA	Europe	Italy	20/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	0030,0040,005B,0070,008A,0110 0130,0140,0150	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2036581	IT0005211237	Italgas SpA	Europe	Italy	21/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	0030,0040,0050	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2019134	IT0004965148	Moncler SpA	Europe	Italy	21/04/2026	Annual	Against	4.1.1,4.2,4.3 7 2.1	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2037514	IT0000066123	BPER Banca SpA	Europe	Italy	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	4a2,4b,4d	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2054207	IT0005385213	NewPrinces SpA	Europe	Italy	27/04/2026	Annual	Against	3.1 4	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2029221	IT0000072170	FinecoBank SpA	Europe	Italy	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	8,9 6.1k,6.1l,6.1m, 6.1n,6.1o,6.1p, 6.1q	Cumulative/slate voting in favour of individual candidates/slates.[DirectorElection2]		1
2036598	IT0001250932	Hera SpA	Europe	Italy	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	6.3,8.3 7,9	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
2034734	IT0004810054	Unipol Assicurazioni SpA	Europe	Italy	29/04/2026	Annual/Special	Against	0030,0040,005 0	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2026724	IT0000072618	Intesa Sanpaolo SpA	Europe	Italy	30/04/2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2019119	IT0005162406	Technogym SpA	Europe	Italy	05/05/2026	Annual/Special	All For			3.1,3.2,5,1	1
2037559	IT0003242622	TERNA Rete Elettrica Nazionale SpA	Europe	Italy	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	3,4,5.2,6,7,8.1, 9 10,11,12.1	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2081696	IT0005452658	Stevanato Group SpA	Europe	Italy	26/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	4 7 6	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will introduce or perpetuate diminished minority shareholder rights.[ShareholderRights3] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1]		1
2090164	IT0000072170	FinecoBank SpA	Europe	Italy	29/06/2026	Extraordinary Shareholders	All For				1
2059966	LU0075646355	Subsea 7 SA	Europe	Luxembourg	12/05/2026	Annual	Against	10. 5. 9.	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2059834	LU0038705702	Millicom International Cellular SA	Europe	Luxembourg	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	9.	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9]		1
2079968	LU0582533245	Robeco Capital Growth Funds - Robeco QI Emerging Conservative Equities	Europe	Luxembourg	28/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2058493	NL0010545661	CNH Industrial N.V.	Europe	Netherlands	08/05/2026	Annual	Against	1.D.	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2028506	NL0000334118	ASM International NV	Europe	Netherlands	11/05/2026	Annual	Against	3.a.,5.	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		3
2029434	NL0006237562	Arcadis NV	Europe	Netherlands	20/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2013351	NL0011872643	ASR Nederland NV	Europe	Netherlands	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	8c	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]	2.d.	1
2040107	NL0010773842	NN Group NV	Europe	Netherlands	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	10.B. 5.	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2067450	NL0009434992	LyondellBasell Industries N.V.	Europe	Netherlands	22/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2035530	NL0012969182	Adyen NV	Europe	Netherlands	28/05/2026	Annual	All For				2
2084419	NL0015002SN0	QIAGEN NV	Europe	Netherlands	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	6.h. 2.,8.	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2039855	NO0010161896	DNB Bank ASA	Europe	Norway	21/04/2026	Annual	All For				1
2039886	NO0003733800	Orkla ASA	Europe	Norway	23/04/2026	Annual	All For				1
2039892	NO0012851874	DOF Group ASA	Europe	Norway	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	12,13,14.2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2059379	ES0105025003	MERLIN Properties SOCIMI SA	Europe	Spain	28/04/2026	Annual	All For				1
2060680	ES0173516115	Repsol SA	Europe	Spain	13/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2055129	ES0144580Y14	Iberdrola SA	Europe	Spain	29/05/2026	Annual	All For			12,16	1
2082109	ES0157261019	Laboratorios Farmaceuticos Rovi SA	Europe	Spain	17/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2087671	ES0178165017	Tecnicas Reunidas SA	Europe	Spain	25/06/2026	Annual	Against	6.1 7	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2037147	SE0015949748	Beijer Ref AB	Europe	Sweden	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	12e,12g 12h 12a 12c 8c,15A,15B,15 C	Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which inline with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2039729	SE0009216278	Mips AB	Europe	Sweden	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	16.1a,16.2	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2039867	SE0015961909	Hexagon AB	Europe	Sweden	24/04/2026	Annual	Against	12.2,12.3 14,16	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2009366	SE0017486889	Atlas Copco AB	Europe	Sweden	28/04/2026	Annual	Against	10a8,10c 10a4 10a2,10a9,12a, 12b	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] 2- Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing risks in its business and wider supply chain related to the respect of human rights which are relevant and material to business opportunity and risk and that changes in board composition would help improve governance and the effectiveness of management in pursuit of long-term value creation.[HumanRights1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2016780	SE0015658109	Epiroc AB	Europe	Sweden	05/05/2026	Annual	Against	10a9,12	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]	8d,10a.2,10a.4,10b	1
2014895	SE0017160773	NCAB Group AB	Europe	Sweden	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	12.1,12.8	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2040892	SE0023135298	Noba Bank Group AB	Europe	Sweden	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	14d 14a,14e 14c,14h 11,16,17	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3] Concerns related to board gender diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2034330	CH0030170408	Geberit AG	Europe	Switzerland	15/04/2026	Annual	Against	9 5.1.3 8.1	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2042279	CH0038863350	Nestle SA	Europe	Switzerland	16/04/2026	Annual	All For				2
2035819	CH0360674466	Galenica AG	Europe	Switzerland	21/04/2026	Annual	Against	7 5.1.7,5.4 1.2	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2037073	CH1176493729	Bachem Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	29/04/2026	Annual	Against	1.2 9 5.4 5.5,5.6,6.2,6.3 5.1,5.2,5.3,6.1	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concerns related to the level of independent directors on the board, which in line with our policy should comprise a majority of directors in order to better protect minority shareholder interests.[BoardStructure1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3]		1
2042282	CH0432492467	Alcon AG	Europe	Switzerland	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	10 5.1	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2042320	CH0100837282	Kardex Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	6 1.2	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2042295	CH1216478797	DSM-Firmenich AG	Europe	Switzerland	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	8 1.3	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2037535	CH0024608827	Partners Group Holding AG	Europe	Switzerland	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	7	Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1]		1
2077051	CH1391448177	BeOne Medicines Ltd.	Europe	Switzerland	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	4e,4h A 20 4b,6a 15a 17,19	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to insufficient disclosures made available by the company to enable recommendation of shareholder support for the management team's proposal.[Disclosure1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that the proposal will result in share issuance which unduly dilutes minority shareholders.[ShareholderRights1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2064742	CA36168Q1046	GFL Environmental Inc.	North America	Canada	13/05/2026	Annual/Special	Against	5 1.5 3,4	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2056544	CA67000B1040	Novanta Inc.	North America	Canada	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	1F	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2063777	CA4488112083	Hydro One Limited	North America	Canada	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	1H	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing climate-related risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateGL3]		1
2059286	CA6752224007	OceanaGold Corporation	North America	Canada	09/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	1.1 4	Concerns related to below-board racial and/or ethnic diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL2] Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4] Management proposal does not advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors nor seeks to protect the current status of shareholder rights at the company.		2
2055901	CA25675T1075	Dollarama Inc.	North America	Canada	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	7 6	Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2059961	CA2499061083	The Descartes Systems Group Inc.	North America	Canada	11/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2064621	CA39944C1005	Groupe Dynamite Inc.	North America	Canada	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2067348	CA49448Q1090	Kinaxis Inc.	North America	Canada	16/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	1h 3	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2068098	CA68634K1066	Orla Mining Ltd.	North America	Canada	16/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	1.4	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise a greater number of independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureGL3]		1
2057169	CA82509L1076	Shopify Inc.	North America	Canada	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	1B 3 1D 4	Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9] 2- Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of shares granted as part of the company's long-term incentive plan.[Remuneration12] 3- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL8] 4- Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the significant use of qualitative metrics.[RemunerationGL3] 5- Concerns that severance pay for a Named Executive Officer is inappropriately high with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Shareholder proposal promotes actions that should help achieve long-term value creation while safeguarding shareholder interests.[ShareholderProposal8]		3
2060843	CA8910546032	Torex Gold Resources Inc.	North America	Canada	17/06/2026	Annual/Special	All For				1
2059800	CA16141A1030	Chartwell Retirement Residences	North America	Canada	18/06/2026	Annual/Special	Against	3.6	Concerns related to overall board diversity not meeting the thresholds as outlined in our policy.[BoardCompositionGL4]		1
2059860	CA11276H1064	Brookfield Infrastructure Corporation	North America	Canada	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.1,1.2,1.9 1.3	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		2
2066463	CA89472Y1079	Trekor Metals Limited	North America	Canada	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	2.2 2.1 2.7 5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2074310	US1251411013	CECO Environmental Corp.	North America	USA	27/05/2026	Annual	Against	3f	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2074306	US88362T1034	Thermon Group Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	27/05/2026	Special	All For				1
2072137	US03831W1080	AppLovin Corporation	North America	USA	03/06/2026	Annual	Against	1b,1d,3,4,5	Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		3
2073224	US31188V1008	Fastly, Inc.	North America	USA	03/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.1	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2075297	US3795772082	Globus Medical, Inc.	North America	USA	03/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a 2	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2074320	US9311421039	Walmart Inc.	North America	USA	04/06/2026	Annual	Against	1j 6,7,8	Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7]		3
2072451	US55955D1000	Magnite, Inc.	North America	USA	08/06/2026	Annual	Against	1B	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2074162	US75734B1008	Reddit, Inc.	North America	USA	08/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.6	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2074233	US2270461096	Crocs, Inc.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.2 4	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2078019	US49845K1016	Klaviyo, Inc.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2074238	US58733R1023	MercadoLibre, Inc.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	1b 2	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		3
2073292	US74276L1052	PROCEPT BioRobotics Corporation	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.1 3	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

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2079630	US8606301021	Stifel Financial Corp.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.8 1.10 4	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2080641	US8725401090	The TJX Companies, Inc.	North America	USA	09/06/2026	Annual	All For				4
2072408	US04010E1091	Argan, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1]		1
2072446	US0901681058	BillionToOne, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2072116	US09227Q1004	Blackbaud, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2083756	US22266M1045	Coursera, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.1 2	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Pay appears misaligned to value to shareholders, based on analysis of Total Shareholder Return performance and consideration of CEO pay relative to company peers.[RemunerationUS1] Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2077736	US31620M1062	Fidelity National Information Services, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1h 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2074159	US38526M1062	Grand Canyon Education, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2080752	US74006W2070	Praxis Precision Medicines, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1c 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2075331	US75960P1049	Remitly Global, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2076294	US80517M1099	Savers Value Village, Inc.	North America	USA	10/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2076400	US01862Q1076	Alliance Laundry Holdings, Inc. (United States)	North America	USA	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2076315	US22266T1097	Coupang, Inc.	North America	USA	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	1g 1f,3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] EOS manual override		1
2070585	US4180561072	Hasbro, Inc.	North America	USA	11/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2075314	US45687V1061	Ingersoll Rand Inc.	North America	USA	11/06/2026	Annual	All For			1j,3	1
2080656	US6098391054	Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.	North America	USA	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.2 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently robust policy to prohibit the hedging of equity-based awards by executives together with strict controls over pledging of shares.[Remuneration11] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]		1
2075278	US75886F1075	Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	North America	USA	12/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to indicators of a lack of detailed succession planning, which in our view is an important driver of long-term effective governance at times of transition of board membership.[BoardStructure6] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4]		1
2081071	US33829M1018	Five Below, Inc.	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	1g,1h 4	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2075348	US49271V1008	Keurig Dr Pepper Inc.	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2076317	US57636Q1040	Mastercard Incorporated	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	1d	oncern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]	1a,1e,1f	4
2075865	US59356Q1085	Miami International Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	3 1.2 1.10 2	Annual votes allow shareholders to express their views every year, keeping boards and committees accountable for their decisions.[Miscellaneous1] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

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2075277	US7055731035	Pegasystems Inc.	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.8 1.6 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concern that the Chair and CEO role are combined, which can lead to a lack of independent oversight of management, particularly when insufficiently balanced by the presence of a Lead Independent Director with adequate powers to ensure the board may act independently of the Chair in certain circumstances.[IndividualDirector2] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of shares granted as part of the company's long-term incentive plan.[Remuneration12] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]		1
2077644	US90138F1021	Twilio Inc.	North America	USA	16/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.4 1.2 4	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2082413	US0527691069	Autodesk, Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	1e 1b,1h,5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2080725	US2786421030	eBay Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	4	Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2077681	US40131M1099	Guardant Health, Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2077624	US5588681057	Madrigal Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.1 1.3 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]		1
2081431	US63845R1077	National Vision Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	All For				1
2081584	US9224751084	Veeva Systems Inc.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	1d 1g	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5]	1h	1
2074620	US92537N1081	Vertiv Holdings Co.	North America	USA	17/06/2026	Annual	Against	1d 1e 2 1a	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that compensation for certain non-executive directors is inappropriately high relative to performance with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of a lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[Remuneration4] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of shares granted as part of the company's long-term incentive plan.[Remuneration12]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		2
2076313	US0576652004	Balchem Corporation	North America	USA	18/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5]		1
2082418	US05550J1016	BJ's Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc.	North America	USA	18/06/2026	Annual	Against	6,7 1.7 2 1.8	Shareholder proposal seeks to address an identified sustainability opportunity or risk which in our view would help the company better manage the risks and opportunities raised by the proposal.[ShareholderProposal7] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3]		2
2076345	US76954A1034	Rivian Automotive, Inc.	North America	USA	22/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a,3	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		2
2079588	US82835W1080	ARS Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	North America	USA	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.2 1.1 3	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2084342	US67066G1040	NVIDIA Corporation	North America	USA	24/06/2026	Annual	Against	1d 2 7 4	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10] Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUS8] LPPI manual override: enhanced disclosure of emissions related to its sold products would allow shareholders to better understand how the company plans to reduce its full value chain emissions and manage its transition to a low-carbon economy Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]	1g	7
2084739	US5738741041	Marvell Technology, Inc.	North America	USA	25/06/2026	Annual	Against	1b 2 4	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Shareholder proposal promotes appropriate accountability as it applies to annual director votes and annual say on pay votes in line with best practice corporate governance and aligned to long-term shareholder value.[ShareholderProposal6]		1
2084738	US5010441013	The Kroger Co.	North America	USA	25/06/2026	Annual	Against	1e,3	Concerns related to the tenure of the auditor, which can indicate a lack of independence, compromised audit quality and excessive familiarity even if the audit partners have transitioned more frequently.[Auditor1]		2
2091211	US82846H4056	QXO, Inc.	North America	USA	29/06/2026	Special	All For				2
2086078	US8334451098	Snowflake Inc.	North America	USA	29/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a 2 1b 4	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructureUS3] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns that the board is not appropriately managing environmental risks which are relevant and material to business opportunities and risks that could impact the company's long-term value.[ClimateUS3] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to a perceived lack of response to relatively low shareholder support on remuneration-related proposals.[Remuneration9] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Shareholder proposal seeks to protect and, where appropriate, advance shareholder rights on behalf of institutional investors.[ShareholderProposal9]		1
2080732	US8969452015	TripAdvisor, Inc.	North America	USA	29/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.5	Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2086082	US10576N1028	Braze, Inc.	North America	USA	30/06/2026	Annual	Against	1a 2	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2095587	US18915M1071	Cloudflare, Inc.	North America	USA	30/06/2026	Annual	Against	1.3 7 4A,4B,4C,4D,4E,4F 1.2 6 3,5	Concerns related to overall board structures that may result in the reduction of shareholder rights.[BoardStructure5] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4 Concerns related to protecting shareholder value, in situations where a board initiates actions or decisions that could potentially diminish, compromise, or place shareholder interests at risk.[Miscellaneous4] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, in particular appearing to display an insufficient combination of simplicity of design, alignment of incentives to long-term company success, material executive shareholdings, accountability of the board to compensation outcomes; and good engagement between the company and investors.[Remuneration1]		1
2042631	JE00B4T3BW64	Glencore Plc	United Kingdom	Jersey	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	13	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[Remuneration2]		1
2045573	GB00B0LCW083	Hikma Pharmaceuticals Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	6	Concerns related to membership of a key committee, which in line with our voting policy should comprise fully independent directors only in order to better protect shareholder interests and avoid undue influence on key committee decisions and oversight.[BoardStructure3] Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2041089	GB00B2B0DG97	RELX Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	23/04/2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]	2	1
2054105	GB00BYX5K988	SigmaRoc Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	30/04/2026	Annual	Against	13	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of more than two types of concurrent variable pay arrangements.[RemunerationUK6]		1
2048110	GB0009465807	The Weir Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	30/04/2026	Annual	All For				2
2048975	GB00BN7SWP63	GSK Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	06/05/2026	Annual	All For			2	2
2042865	GB00B033F229	Centrica Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2042190	GB00BHJYC057	InterContinental Hotels Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07/05/2026	Annual	Against	4i 2	Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]		2
2044215	GB0004082847	Standard Chartered Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07/05/2026	Annual	All For			3,24	2
2065072	GB00BG49KP99	Tritax Big Box REIT plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	07/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2045498	GB0005405286	HSBC Holdings Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	08/05/2026	Annual	All For			2	1
2065428	GB00BWFGQN14	Spirax Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUK9]		2
2052954	GB00BVZK7T90	Unilever Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	13/05/2026	Annual	Against	3	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationUK7]	2,7	2
2055857	GB00B06QFB75	IG Group Holdings plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	6,10,13	Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion		1
2038978	GB00BP6MXD84	Shell Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	19/05/2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that compensation for non-executive directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[Remuneration15]		1
2068057	GB0006640972	4imprint Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	20/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2052750	GB00B4YZN328	Coats Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	5 3	Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationGL9]		1
2047674	GB0031638363	Intertek Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	20/05/2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationGL7]		1
2058252	GB00BSZBP530	Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21/05/2026	Annual	Against	2	Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the use of share options. Concerns that compensation for CEO is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds		2
2074594	GB00B0CY5V57	Serica Energy Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	21/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2050890	GB00BKRC5K31	Genuit Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	22/05/2026	Annual	All For				1
2076006	GB00BN44P254	Baltic Classifieds Group Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	27/05/2026	Special	All For				1

Meeting ID	ISIN	Company Name	Investment Region	Country	Meeting Date	Meeting Type	Votes For/Against Management	Agenda Item Numbers	Voting Explanation	Vote By Exception	Ballot Count
2034766	GB0007099541	Prudential Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	7,9,10,11 2,3	Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion.[BoardCompositionGL5] Concerns that compensation for certain Named Executive Directors is inappropriately high relative to performance, based on the ratio of variable pay to fixed salary with compensation beyond what is necessary is an indicator of lack of effective governance and a poor use of limited company funds.[RemunerationGL7]		1
2052567	GB00B82YXW83	Vesuvius Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	28/05/2026	Annual	Against	8	Concerns related to board composition as indicated by failure to meet targets set out in UK FCA listing rules on diversity and inclusion Concern that the director has insufficient time to dedicate to the their directorship, particularly at times of heavy demand for board oversight, taking into account other commitments including relevant board, executive and other formal positions.[DirectorElection1]		1
2080654	GB00BNK03D49	Luxfer Holdings Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	11/06/2026	Annual	Against	3 5 8,9	Concerns related to board composition and the balance of skills, experience and range of industry and sector experience which generally contribute towards good governance across different types of issues that must be addressed by the business over time.[BoardCompositionUS1] Concerns related to the governance of executive compensation due to repeated incidents of development of remuneration proposals which appear insufficiently aligned to long-term value for the company and for shareholders.[Remuneration5] Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the relatively low shareholding requirement.[RemunerationUS9]Concerns that remuneration policy design is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on the lack of a sufficiently effective clawback policy in the event of cases of fraud, material financial misstatement, conduct or reputational issues.[Remuneration10]Concerns that remuneration is insufficiently aligned to long-term shareholder value, based on performance share units being granted which vest over a relatively short time-scale of less than 36 months.[Remuneration13]Concerns that overall compensation for the CEO is inappropriately high relative to other Named Executive Officers. In our view, compensation beyond what is necessary is not a good use of limited company resources and can be in indicator or lack of effective governance.[RemunerationUS7]		1
2085233	GB00BLGZ9862	Tesco Plc	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	18/06/2026	Annual	Abstain	7	Withdrawn resolution.		1